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Abstract 
This article examines the separate epistemologies of anthropology 
and neoclassical economics, suggesting that both epistemologies are 
tied to and represent ethical stances.   After discussing the differences 
between morality and ethics, it suggests that the epistemologies of 
both disciplines are rooted in colonial encounters.  Although 
numerous states and empires had previously encountered 
populations on their peripheries, the European colonial encounter of 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century was uniquely on 
an industrial scale, creating new epistemological and ethical 
problems, out of which both economics and anthropology emerged.   
The global episteme and ethical stance of anthropology in its 
engagement with diversity now has as its frontier an engagement 
with powerful institutions in the business world.  
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The frontiers of the social sciences are both epistemological and ethical.  
As scientific insight advances, ethical insight must keep pace. This is 
equally true, whether regarding insights into statecraft supplied by 
political science, insights into markets supplied by economics, or insights 
into human nature supplied by anthropology. A hundred years ago, the 
frontiers of anthropology were found in confrontations with indigenous 
peoples, whether in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, and in comprehending 
what their exotic customs meant for humanity. Two hundred fifty years 
ago, the frontiers of economics were found in the newly emerging 
international markets, and what these implied for the meaning of value. 
Today, the frontiers of both are found in the engagement of powerful 
research methods with contemporary institutions, whether in those of 
business, government, or medicine.     
In this article we examine how two social science disciplines, 
anthropology and neoclassical economics, have raised, if not always 
successfully resolved, ethical issues as their disciplines advanced. The 
ethical issues that we wish to stress are about redefinitions of the good 
life―redefinitions that ramify far beyond their respective disciplinary 
boundaries. Although our focus is primarily on anthropology, we contrast 
the anthropological episteme with that of neoclassical economics, in part 
to make clear that these epistemes share a common historical specificity. 
We first examine the distinctions among morality, ethics, and 
epistemology. We then examine the origins of anthropology in European 
expansion and neoclassical economics in the rise of capitalism, pointing 
out that the epistemes resulting from these origins carry far-reaching 
ethical implications. The Industrial Revolution thrust concerns that might 
have been confined to drawing-rooms into political arenas, turning 
privileged debates into public issues.  This political turn in debates that 
are fundamentally epistemological ‒ that is, having their foundation in 
what we can and cannot know and how we know it ‒ is recognition both 
of the power of these disciplines and their methods, and of unfinished 
business ahead of them. 
It may seem odd within the profession to characterize anthropology 
as “powerful,” inasmuch as it is frequently a conceit among 
anthropologists to view themselves as observers sitting on the edge of 
conversations, as in “marginal natives” (Freilich 1970).  Power 
imbalances have always been central to anthropology, whether in the 
field, the classroom, or the professional association. If there were no 
power imbalances, there would be no public debates over issues of ethics. 
Our methods, however, whether in participant observation or in curating 
and archiving, do have the potential to do great good or harm, just as our 
findings have the potential to do great good.  These are facts that should 
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place ethical inquiry ‒ understood in the broader sense offered here of 
more than simple code compliance ‒ at the forefront of any 
anthropological inquiry.    
 
Ethics, morality and epistemology  
In the past thirty years, numerous debates over ethics have troubled the 
anthropological profession, most typically in response to allegations over 
mistreatment of either indigenous peoples or colleagues. Recent 
allegations of abuse ‒ such as Chagnon’s Noble Savages ‒ are simply the 
latest chapter in a century-long history of accusations of divided loyalties, 
collegial abuse, and exploitation of vulnerable populations (Caplan 2003; 
Chagnon 2013; Fluehr-Lobban 2003; Tierney 2000; Whiteford and 
Trotter 2008).  These debates have frequently spilled over into 
questioning of anthropology’s fundamental character, of its inquiries into 
the customs, institutions, and intimacies of populations defined as 
“Others.” At times, such inquiries are clearly predatory, whether 
harvesting folk customs for commercial exploitation or invading villagers’ 
privacy. In such cases ethical concerns are obviously warranted. Much 
more subtle, however, and much more typical today, are inquiries into 
such areas as consumer research, or community-building, that attempt to 
bridge gulfs between indigenous peoples (whether in rain-forest 
Amazonia or middle-class suburbia) and large, powerful institutions. The 
manner in which these debates frequently spill over into accusations 
about the good faith (or lack thereof) of the antagonists suggests that 
oftentimes something far larger is at stake.    
Some of this heat reflects the fact that various conceptions of 
reason can have particular moralities tied to them (MacIntyre 1988:1-12).  
Examining some fine-grained distinctions between the terms morality 
and ethics, and how they are embedded within the research enterprise, 
can help explain the controversy. Although in popular usage the terms 
“morals” and “ethics” are synonyms and have the same or nearly the same 
meaning, there are differences. For our purposes here, the term morals 
refers to beliefs about proper conduct specific to some society or other 
group such as a religion (Stanford 2002). While ethics, in contrast, refers 
to a set of abstract principles that we must interpret in order to 
determine what is proper behavior (Audi 1995). Thus, the difference is 
between moral conventions for proper behavior ‒ for example, on a hot 
day, always offer a guest something to drink upon their arrival ‒ and 
abstract ethical principles for how one should live one’s life ‒ for example, 
do unto others, as you would have them do unto you.  
Confusion between morals and ethics can hold important 
implications for epistemology that sometimes have far reaching 
consequences.  Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that analyzes 
the nature of knowledge and how it relates to reasoning about connected 
notions like belief, and justification. One of the perennial epistemological 
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questions of relevance here is illustrated by the following: 
There is an Indian story—at least I heard it as an Indian 
story—about an Englishman who, having been told that the 
world rested on a platform, which rested on the back of an 
elephant, which in turn rested on the back of a turtle, asked 
(perhaps he was an ethnographer; it is the way they behave) 
what did the turtle rest on?” “Another turtle!” And that turtle? 
“Ah, Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down.”   
(Geertz 1973:28-29) 
Geertz’s anecdote is a popular illustration of the problem of infinite 
regress: given some belief b, it is reasonable to expect a justification for b. 
If that justification takes the form of another belief, b2, it is again 
reasonably to expect a justification for b2, and so on, and so forth.  One 
possible outcome to this search for justification terminates with certain 
self-justifying statements. This foundational model of the structure of 
knowledge is like a building with the privileged, self-justifying beliefs first 
functioning as the foundation and then providing inferential justification 
for other statements that build upon that foundation (Sosa 1980:3-25).   
Foundationalist theories of knowledge have been with us since at 
least the Enlightenment, tracing back to Descartes and Kant, and are 
relevant here because of our discussion of the principles of ethics that 
derive from philosophies of life. Such philosophical principles can, and 
often have, served as the privileged, self-justifying statements for various 
foundational theories of knowledge. The original principles were often 
drawn from rationalism or religion, and hence were thought to be 
universalizable to all human kind. Claims of universal truth or validity 
were, of course, an aspiration of the Enlightenment. However, as 
institutionalized religion has lost some of its privileged status in western 
society, the foundational principles have taken many other claims and 
beliefs as their source ‒ most notably, for our purposes here, that of 
utilitarianism, of which we will have more to say later.  
The challenge of cultural diversity and ethics, which has been 
discussed at least since Kant (1724-1804), tends to undercut foundational 
theories and their aspirations towards universalizability. This 
epistemological challenge is spotlighted by anthropology’s careful, 
empirical work over the past century, work that has contributed to a 
different epistemology, inspired by the Romantic Era, which concentrates 
attention on what is particular and unique rather than on that which is 
universal; a coherentist model that offers a different basis for ethical 
discourse.      
A coherentist model for the structure of knowledge is somewhat 
akin to a ship at sea, maintained by repairs to any part in need. 
Coherentists typically hold that justification is solely a function of some 
relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged in the manner 
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argued by foundationalists. This view of justification of knowledge 
parallels the empirical findings of anthropology, and it is largely, although 
not entirely, within coherentist systems of epistemology that 
anthropological research is performed.   
To help illustrate the opposition between foundationalist and 
coherentist models, let us consider a simplified example of the opposition 
between formalist and substantivist models from economic anthropology. 
Polanyi first formulated the formalist versus subtantivist opposition in his 
The Great Transformation (1944). He proposed that the substantive (that 
is, coherentist) model exists in pre-industrial economies where 
livelihoods are based on redistribution and/or reciprocity as part of long-
term relationships. Redistribution entails the presence of a robust central 
leadership often rooted in kinship that first accepts and then redistributes 
goods in concurrence with cultural principles. Reciprocity is the exchange 
of commodities and/or assistance within long-term relationships, and the 
exchange largely makes those relationships possible.  Substantive 
economies are moral economies, where interlocking, coherent webs of 
beliefs about how people should behave in personal and social 
relationships are of crucial concern.   
The formalist (that is, foundationalist) model, by contrast, was the 
product of rational principles and largely operative in market exchange. 
These principles were derived from a philosophical system that assumed 
maximization of utility as key to the good life, and thereby replacing 
traditions, values, and emotions as behavioral motives with that of 
rational calculation. Formalist economies are based on a utilitarian ethical 
system and suggest that aspirations to a larger or global scale, such as the 
scaling up of economies afforded by the Industrial Revolution, create new 
sorts of ethical challenges.  
In sum, the epistemological questions for any social science of what 
we can know and how can we know it are closely related to the ethical 
and moral systems to which they are tied. Enlightenment-inspired ethical 
universalism can blind researchers to that which is particular, while a 
Romantic-inspired particularism can miss universals in favor of that 
which is unique. The challenge comes when one of these perspectives is 
neglected―when, for example, the specific codes of one institution or 
discipline are assumed to apply universally.  
 
Colonial epistemologies 
Anthropology’s early work was always done in a colonial context, in 
which a dominant industrialized or industrializing power confronted a 
“primitive” Other. Thus, the anthropological episteme was, and often still 
is, always colored by such power imbalances. Is this unacceptable, 
unavoidable, or just a fact of the human condition with which any social 
science will always have to struggle?   
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The term episteme, from which the word epistemology is 
etymologically derived, comes from the ancient Greek word for 
knowledge, as in "justified true belief." An ‘anthropological episteme’ is 
used here in Foucault’s specialized sense as follows:     
   I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic 
apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the 
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable 
within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, 
and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is 
the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the 
true from the false, but of what may from what may not be 
characterised as scientific.  
(Foucault 1980:197) 
In other words, Foucault used the term to mean the epistemological prior 
assumptions that grounds what is accepted by society as justified true 
belief, also known as “knowledge,” within a particular historical period. 
These accepted epistemological priors are like the sea in which the fish of 
humanity swim, or the air which we all breathe.  They are unconscious, 
basic, and invisible to the people operating within them. Several such 
epistemes may co-exist and interact at the same time as part of a verity of 
power-knowledge systems and are not confined just to the scientific field 
(Foucault 1972:31-40, 50-56).    
The anthropological episteme we discuss was characterized by the 
epistemological assumptions of modernity, because it developed within 
the context of a dominant modernist worldview that completely 
enveloped the academy. Giddens describes the term modernity as: 
...a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial 
civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a 
certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world 
as open to transformation, by human intervention; (2) a 
complex of economic institutions, especially industrial 
production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of 
political institutions, including the nation-state and mass 
democracy. Largely as a result of these characteristics, 
modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of 
social order. It is a society ‒ more technically, a complex of 
institutions ‒ which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in the 
future, rather than the past.  
(Giddens 1998:94). 
This future-oriented dynamism is thus historically specific, and it is little 
more than modernist self-congratulation to celebrate this dynamism in 
preference to stability.   
Our focus on modernity here is on how it functions as a dominant 
Journal of Business Anthropology, Special Issue 1, Spring 2014 
 
 102 
conceptual framework, acting as an epistemological sieve that sanctifies, 
validates, and orders what is and is not acceptable knowledge. One way in 
which modernity acted in this manner is through its mystification of an 
unrealistic “neutral” scientific objectivity (Asad 1973:17-18).  
Anthropology was deeply scarred by this mystification and the veil over 
the manipulations of the powerful that it helped to produce:  academic 
anthropologists, like most academics, have little familiarity with the 
upper reaches of powerful institutions, and thus are vulnerable when 
they find themselves manipulated toward questionable ends by those 
institutions.    
Epistemes thus have ethical consequences.  The postmodern turn in 
the social sciences thoroughly discredited illusions of positivistic, 
scientific objectivity and helped reveal the manipulations of the powerful. 
Unfortunately, this new found insight has sometimes resulted in a 
deconstructive stance which is, wittingly or not, founded on an ethic of 
nihilism. As an alternative to this negation of meaning, which we would 
suggest has only a shaky foundation; in our concluding section we will 
describe an ethic of anthropological engagement, which business 
anthropology can uniquely supply.  
 
Liberalism and the retreat from the common good 
Roughly contemporaneous with Europeans’ encounters with “primitive” 
Others were the rise of capitalism and the claim that private 
appropriation, aided by the “invisible hand” of the market, could 
contribute to the common good.   Classic treatments of this rise, and its 
moral implications, include Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis, R. H. Tawney’s 
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, or David Landes’s Prometheus 
Unbound.  These developments have both epistemological and ethical 
consequences. Entire libraries have been devoted to investigating the 
causes of these development and their moral consequences; far less 
attention has been paid to their epistemic consequences for the two social 
sciences that arose out of it, economics and anthropology. 
Louis Dumont, in From Mandeville to Marx, traced the genesis of 
economic ideology from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, noting 
that in the Middle Ages what we now call economics was thoroughly 
embedded within and subordinate to statecraft. Although his 
investigation was primarily in the realm of ideas, we can take note of 
some specific material antecedents: the increasing absolutism and 
corruption of state formations, primarily monarchies, both in England 
and on the Continent; the accumulating momentum of material interests ‒ 
both in the countryside through enclosure movements, and in the cities 
through a rising mercantile class; and in New World explorations, which 
brought new sources of wealth, whether in the increasing supply of 
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precious metals, new “goods” such as tobacco and sugar,1 or new supplies 
of unfree labor.   
The net result of these developments, as Dumont describes, was a 
fundamental questioning of value. Religiously rooted ideas of the good life 
were called into question when the corruption of religious institutions 
was revealed. Discoveries in the natural sciences unsettled the 
cosmologies on which these earlier value formations were founded. The 
growth of international trade, facilitated by an increasing money supply 
and the end of the wars of religion provoked a re-evaluation of trade: the 
exchange of goods and services, which hitherto had been seen as a zero-
sum game (your gain is my loss), came to be seen as mutually beneficial. 
Wealth came to be seen as the exertion of human labor on Nature, a point 
of view articulated in John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government.    
“In the beginning, all the world was America,” according to Locke’s 
Second Treatise, meaning that before civil institutions were created, the 
Earth was unspoiled nature ripe for Man’s picking.2 Locke asserted this 
not appreciating that the State of Nature is invariably some other tribe’s 
commons. The enclosures of commons in England and the appropriation 
of fields and forests in the Americas were both movements to elbow aside 
shared, communal goods with the creation of privately appropriated 
property.    
Out of this intellectual ferment, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations, provided a coherent view of the nature of wealth and its increase.  
For Smith and the rising mercantile class, wealth was no longer a zero-
sum game, but rather could be increased through liberalised trade, in 
which the “Invisible Hand” would adjust supplies and demands thus 
creating a net benefit. The Good, of course, was equated with human 
enjoyment and happiness; for Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarians, this 
meant that the greatest good for the greatest number should be the 
objective of public decisions.    
Within the episteme of utilitarianism, there is an ethical statement, 
to the effect that value resides in whatever the highest bidder is willing to 
pay: the values of the marketplace.   The consequences of this for 
institutional corruption have been widely discussed, and need not be 
reviewed here (see Callon 1998, for example).   We simply note that 
utilitarianism presents itself as a form of intellectual laziness, a dis-
engagement with the complexities of value that history creates. An 
educated man or woman might discuss the relative aesthetic and moral 
                                                        
1 This, of course, vastly oversimplifies considerable economic history, and totally 
glosses over contemporary debates about the nature of value and where it might 
reside.   For purposes of this brief article, we might simply note that the 
introduction of new goods and servants was central to the material expansion of 
the seventeenth century, and that it requires a particular point of view to  regard 
tobacco, like several of these other developments as an unqualified “good.”    
2 The gendered language here is intentional.  
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qualities of a Mondrian or a Rembrandt. Likewise, scholars can debate the 
relative contributions of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham to the 
advancement of knowledge. But only an auctioneer or tax collector would 
think of assigning differential numbers to Kant’s Critique of Human 
Reason, Rembrandt’s The Syndics of the Draper’s Guild, or Mondrian’s 
Amaryllis, as meaningful statements comparing their relative values. Yet, 
as we enlarge our social practices, either through colonial exploration in 
the nineteenth century or global engagement in the twentieth, the market 
episteme reduces all diversity to egotistical calculation.   
 
Industrializing colonialism 
Seventeenth and eighteenth century confrontations with Europe’s Other 
was distinguished from earlier state/tribal confrontations by the fact that 
the dominant party was an industrial or industrializing power, which 
enabled the confrontation to exist on a much larger scale. States and 
empires have confronted tribal Others on their peripheries since the 
beginning of recorded history: Tacitus’ first-century descriptions of the 
Germanic tribes in Scythia might be considered proto-anthropological, 
inasmuch as he was attempting to determine if they shared a common 
humanity with his fellow Romans. Colonial confrontations in the Modern 
Era, from the seventeenth century onward, have been tinged with 
Enlightenment ideas of shared humanity, and from the eighteenth century 
onward, with ideals of equality and the recession of slavery. 
Anthropology’s “colonial encounter” (Asad 1973) in fact pre-dates 
academic anthropology by millennia.    
Far more critical to modern anthropology’s character, however, is 
the fact that this encounter was occurring at the same time as the colonial 
powers were industrializing. The early days of industrialization were less 
about gangs of wage-laborers working in steam-powered mills, and more 
about large masses of the lower orders, forcibly impressed, working in 
sugar factories in the Caribbean, textile mills in the Midlands, or coal 
mines in Northumbria. Tobacco plantations in Virginia and silver mines in 
Mexico were later appearances of industrialization. In these factories and 
mines motive power was initially from horses or humans on treadmills. 
Karl Marx stated that the steam engine gave history the factory system 
and the bourgeoisie, but the fact that colonial sugar factories pre-date the 
invention of the steam engine by at least a century suggests that the 
causal sequence was the other way around.3     
In short, a second element in anthropology’s character is that its 
colonial confrontations have been occurring on a large scale, the scale 
                                                        
3 The interplay of instrumental, institutional, and economic factors is a complex 
story, well started by Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization.  Our objective 
here is less to re-tell the story than to make clear that it is more complex than the 
technological determinism with which it is often told.  
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afforded by the Industrial Revolution. What was previously a local and 
particularistic affair ‒ Tacitus’ encounter with a tribal chief, or Herodotus’ 
puzzlement over some barbarian rituals ‒ now acquired a global and 
universal scale.  With European exploration and global circumnavigation 
from the 16th century onward, tribal Others were no longer figures on the 
edge of the map, fringe areas fading off into insignificance, but could 
rather be imagined as sharing a single globe and a common humanity. It 
was this global and empirical episteme that created the Other as a figure 
standing for the numerous others on the fringes of powerful régimes.   
This tension between particularism and universalism has been a 
hallmark of anthropology. On the one hand, anthropology has celebrated 
particularity and diversity, studying in careful detail the ways of life of 
many groups of indigenous peoples. The resulting ethnographic record is 
anthropology’s noblest and most lasting contribution, whose achievement 
is measured not in foundation grants but in lifetime commitments to 
indigenous peoples and the sacrifices of fieldwork among them. On the 
other hand, it has deployed categories that aspire to universalism, 
whether Tylor’s “savage” and “barbarian,” or in the twentieth century 
distinctions between tribes and bands, or single-factor explanations such 
as cultural materialism. 
We will name this vision anthropology’s “global episteme,” 
inasmuch as it created an empirical understanding of shared humanity 
shaped less by theological commitments and more by scientific 
observation on a global scale. This idea is so ingrained within 
anthropology that we seldom reflect on how radical it has been. It is the 
global episteme that enabled Franz Boas to assert that Europeans and 
indigenous peoples alike shared a common humanity, and that 
differences in race, language, or culture were accidents of history rather 
than marks of fundamental differences. It is the global episteme that has 
motivated tens of thousands of ethnographers to travel to every corner of 
the Earth, balancing the frisson of exoticism with a commitment to shared 
humanity. And it has been the global episteme that has provided the 
intellectual foundation for the thorough discrediting of racism and 
ethnocentrism.    
This commitment to ideas of a common humanity is itself a 
foundationalist statement which, pace Franz Boas, careful empirical 
research can neither prove nor disprove. Race, Language, and Culture 
demonstrated the inconsistencies (that is, lack of coherence) in 
assumptions about racial differences, but ultimately the meaning of 
humanity is as much a philosophical as an empirical question. These dual 
philosophical and empirical impulses have propelled the anthropological 
progress of the twentieth century.  
The global episteme is also an ethical commitment. With the 
increasing awareness of diverse cultures and value systems that were 
neither reducible nor commensurable with those of Europe, a central 
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problem in moral philosophy has been to find ethical truths that apply to 
all of humanity. Typical responses to this have included scepticism (the 
suspension of ethical judgment), nihilism (the denial of any ethical 
propositions), and relativism.  Anthropology’s commitment to cultural 
relativism is often interpreted as an ethical relativism, an acceptance of 
diverse codes of values with little or no effort to reconcile their 
differences.    
Jeffrey Stout, in Ethics After Babel (1988), develops the concept of 
“social practices” as the loci of ethical reasoning, activities where ethical 
choices are always present. Similar to Lave and Wenger’s “communities of 
practice” (1991), social practices are those activities where goods internal 
to the practice can be achieved only through experience and engagement 
with others. Stout gives examples such as medicine, baseball, chess-
playing, and teaching as social practices; we might add developing 
innovative products or negotiating new business relationships as other 
examples. Each of these can and frequently are pursued for external 
goods such as fame, glory, and monetary reward, but the internal goods, 
whether the achievement of skill or the cementing of relationships, are 
more permanent and less alienable. Ethical dilemmas are frequently 
created when one places external goods such as monetary reward ahead 
of internal goods.   
Anthropology’s global engagement is a social practice. Over the past 
century it has created a community of scholars and practitioners who 
share the insights of a body of theory and the values and complexity of 
cultural relativism and who, most typically, hope to change at least one 
small corner of the world. The ethical reasoning within this episteme is 
one that embraces a vocabulary of diversity and growth, as alternatives to 
more dominant ethical vocabularies of religious orthodoxies or cost-
benefit analysis.   
This ethical center holds equally well as indigenous peoples are 
increasingly touched by, connected to, or assimilated within multinational 
networks.  Differential distributions of resources, technologies, 
knowledge, and power within these networks define human differences 
just as much as differentials in customs did a century ago. Understanding 
these networks and institutions ‒ not as extraterrestrial invaders, but 
rather as parts of a shared project of humanity ‒ is the next 
anthropological challenge. When anthropology turned its gaze toward the 
institutions of capitalist business, it brought with it the methods of 
ethnographic immersion that had served so well with indigenous peoples.    
 
Evading diversity through utilitarianism 
In sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century Europe, parallel 
developments in the discovery of new sources of wealth in the Americas, 
the creation of the factory system, the exploitation of new resources in 
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Africa, the acquisition of colonies in the New World, and the rise of 
slavery, had multiple consequences: these created an epistemological 
crisis in European thought, a political crisis in European governance, and 
an ethical crisis in European manners and morals. Settled epistemes in 
the natural and political order were called into question by these 
developments, and leading philosophers and statesmen grappled with the 
answers.   
The rise of liberalism (understood here as the foundation of 
rational actor economics) is described by Dumont’s From Mandeville to 
Marx, where he shows how early economic theorists―from Quesnay and 
Mandeville, and culminating in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations―freed economics from subordination to politics, and provided 
the epistemological and ethical foundation for economics and the 
ascendance of business values. 
Measured on its own terms, this was a tremendous success. The 
unquestioned economic prosperity of today’s world was possible only 
because economic values were no longer in thrall to religious, political, or 
familial values. Optimizing a complex system for the performance of a 
single variable is easy once that variable is no longer functionally 
subservient to other variables. The entire career of modernization and 
modernity has been the freeing of individualistic, utilitarian values from 
other considerations.   
The rise of neoclassical economics is, we would suggest, a 
doppelganger to the rise of anthropology, inasmuch as the two represent 
mirror-images of a response to the same epistemological and historical 
developments: the one emphasizing individualism and acquisitiveness, 
the other representing social formations and sharing, for example, 
kinship.     
In the Anglophone world, a dominant solution was crystallized in 
The Wealth of Nations. For Adam Smith, production through labor and 
appropriation from nature, and exchange, were the two sources of value, 
regardless of the peoples or customs involved. For Smith, the ultimate 
good was human happiness, a position codified by Jeremy Bentham’s 
utilitarianism. This, however, dissolves the distinction between extrinsic 
and intrinsic goods, “drowning the most heavenly ecstasies of religious 
fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy 
bath of egotistical calculation” (Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto).  
As a least-common-denominator solution to the experienced facts of 
cultural confrontation that European expansion was creating, the 
utilitarianism of neoclassical economics represents a form of intellectual 
laziness, an unwillingness to wrestle with the confrontations of value 
systems that were attendant upon European expansion in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.  The reduction of all 
values to a cash nexus is a least-common denominator solution which, 
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while having its own coherence, ignores huge swaths of the human 
condition.   
The reductionism of economics has been widely criticized, scarcely 
disturbing the hegemony economics and technocratic rationality in the 
world today. Anthropological interrogations of this hegemony (Graeber 
2012, Maurer 2005; Parry and Bloch 1989; Zelizer 1994) have pointed 
out that numerous other value systems and institutional arrangements 
are equally capable of providing the necessities of life and supporting a 
satisfying existence, while doing less violence to the social or physical 
environment.  In today’s global oecumene, acceptance and rejection of 
diversity are competing ethical stances.   
Reductionism has always been epistemologically suspect, reducing 
complex causal and inferential webs to single-factor explanations. 
Reductionism, we would like to suggest, is also ethically suspect, a 
displacement of the richness of value that the world presents in favor of a 
least-common denominator of pleasure or happiness. The values that the 
world presents are sometimes incommensurable ‒ think of the values of a 
conversation among close friends and the values of intellectual rigor ‒ 
but, as Scott Fitzgerald suggested, “the test of a first-rate intelligence is 
the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and 
still retain the ability to function.” In simpler times, complexity could be 
seen as an affectation; today it is an ethical obligation.  
 
Engaging institutional diversity as an ethical stance 
Anthropology implicitly embodies ethical stances, although whether 
those should be the ethics of the academy, the political world, or the 
business world, is an open question. Each of these institutions – academy, 
politics, commerce – has its own ethical character, easily misunderstood 
and parodied from the outside, but taken with great seriousness on the 
inside.   
The ethics of the academy stresses intellectual probity, respect for 
evidence and learned authority, and respect for students and colleagues. 
Open communication is an absolute imperative, and a test of scientific 
integrity is a willingness to report findings that don’t support the 
hypothesis one is trying to advance. Within the academy, owning up to 
disproving experimental results is a badge of honor, if not always worldly 
success. 
The ethics of the political world, by contrast, emphasizes statecraft 
‒ broadly construed here as institutional commitment and advancement. 
Loyalty and commitment are imperatives, and detachment carries no 
merit. Respect for authority is a must, although the legitimacy of authority 
and the manner in which it is bestowed or achieved varies widely. 
Deception is frequently necessary, although it should always be in service 
of a larger good:  In confrontational situations that political arenas afford, 
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the preciousness of truth often requires that it be attended by a 
bodyguard of lies.4 As broader areas of life become politicized and 
confrontational, the first casualty is integrity.  
In between these extremes of collegial cooperation and civic rivalry 
are the ethics of the business world. The rapid evolution of business 
ethics is described in an edited volume by philosopher Julian Friedland, 
Doing Well and Good (Friedland 2009). Compared to states and 
academies, businesses, particularly multinational businesses, are 
exceedingly immature institutions. Few businesses have had the centuries 
of experience needed to work through ethical dilemmas, or the traditional 
resources to fall back on for resolution of ongoing dilemmas. Ethical 
dilemmas of the business world today include the relative priorities of 
profits, customers, employees, or communities. They include divided 
obligations inside and outside the firm. They also include definitions of 
the good:  is product “good” because it can be sold, or because it embodies 
some more intrinsic values? Although nearly all corporations have 
statements of ethics, these are frequently little more than window-
dressing, containing statement about “doing the right thing,” or treating 
everyone fairly.  Platitudes such as these are a poor substitute for the 
difficult work of ethical reasoning.   From an academic perspective, 
business is all too often seen as an Other, and for a learned scholar to be 
mucking around in its messy priorities is considered by some academics 
to be an abomination.5   
An historical and anthropological perspective would recognize that 
this immaturity is developmental rather than existential. Just as new 
insights into kinship systems were achieved with Goody’s concept of the 
developmental cycle of domestic groups (Goody 1958; see also Adizes 
1988), a thorough analysis of the developmental cycle of domestic 
institutions is waiting to be written. Karl Marx, in the nineteenth century, 
saw capitalism as a revolutionary force, and Joseph Schumpter in the 
twentieth century coined the phrase “creative destruction” to describe 
the process of technological innovation. In any society, tradition is a 
resource for ethical reasoning, yet almost by definition traditions require 
decades if not centuries to develop. Declaring an established social 
practice such as business to be off-limits and untouchable is itself a form 
of ethical shirking.  
                                                        
4 “In war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a 
bodyguard of lies.”   Attributed to Winston Churchill during World War II.   
5 The strong language used here borrows from Mary Douglas (Purity and 
Danger), as adapted by Jeffrey Stout in Ethics After Babel, to describe unique 
forms of ethical problems having to do with defilement or pollution.  It is 
intentionally used here to reflect our experience with some anthropologists who 
found the business world to be unavoidably polluting.   The recession of such 
sentiments in recent years is as much reflective of epistemological progress in 
the academy as it is of changes in the business world.  
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Applied scientific disciplines such as business anthropology or 
medical anthropology face an ethical dilemma, inasmuch as they must 
conform to, or at least take cognizance of, the ethical standards both of 
scientific inquiry and of the institutional context in which they are 
engaged. Developmental anthropologists, for example, have to take 
cognizance of the (quite varied) ethical stances of development 
organizations, just as medical anthropologists must have a familiarity 
with medical ethics. Within medical communities, ethical reasoning goes 
back to Hippocrates (a tradition), and has been proven by centuries of 
experience, although increasingly challenged by the commodification of 
medical services. By contrast, within the business world, the institutional 
dominance of businesses in the modern world and their immaturity 
makes this more difficult.   
With some business institutions  ethical judgments are easier than 
in others: the contrast between a small community hospital, on the one 
hand, and a medical institution that is part of a corporate chain, on the 
other ‒ between one that serves all members of a community and one 
that pumps up its profits with questionable tests and treatments ‒ is 
fairly obvious. The ethical character of firms in the business world 
mirrors the complexity of the larger society. Some firms are virtuous 
suppliers of life’s necessities in food, shelter, and personal care.  Others 
(such as Enron) have business models based on swindling their investors. 
Some firms create new forms of value, enriching the lives of millions; 
others are frankly predatory. Most businesses are somewhere in between.    
The simplistic resolution of standing above such engagements 
obviously won’t do.   Like all other sciences, anthropology’s progress as a 
theoretical discipline rested on its applied engagements in actual, 
empirical problems, which included those of colonial rule or 
multinational marketing. Had Malinowski or Radcliffe-Brown decided 
that they didn’t want to get their hands dirty in Melanesia or the Indian 
Ocean, British social anthropology might never have been born.  Had 
Franz Boas been content to conduct “armchair anthropology,” progress 
against racial prejudice would have been set back by decades. Had Lloyd 
Warner and his associates not studied the Western Electric plant, insights 
into observer effects (the so-called “Hawthorne Effect”) would have had 
to wait for some other practical engagement.  Debating the boundaries of 
such engagements is an important part of anthropological training.  
By going to the Andaman Islands and the Trobriands, Radcliffe-
Brown and Malinowski made the sort of ethical choices that are 
increasingly required in the modern world: a willingness to embrace and 
learn from diversity. Instead of either disdaining the “savages” (which, 
itself, is a tribal solution, an othering), or seeking to exploit them or their 
environment (the utilitarian approach), the discipline they founded 
sought to learn from them, and to enlarge the scope of social practices in 
which Edwardian England (and later the rest of Europe and finally the 
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developed world) engaged. The social milieux of British (and American) 
academics in the early twentieth century was a comfortable insularity, 
with unpleasant confrontations outsourced to the colonies, or kept in 
check in the urban slums and industrial districts. By bursting the mental 
bonds of this insularity, the anthropologists of the first half of the 
twentieth century enlarged the social practices and mental capacities of 
all educated men and women.    
This was as much an ethical exercise as it was an intellectual 
achievement. By mid-century the racist and ethnocentric assumptions of 
numerous institutions were thoroughly discredited, even though some 
have been slow to catch on to this fact. By mid-century, educated men and 
women could accept that all peoples around the world shared a common 
humanity, even if their values, their religions, their dietary habits, and 
their mating rituals seemed quite varied and unusual. This is ethical 
progress.  
Paradoxically, in parallel with these developments, the rise of 
global business formations in the last 40 years is creating new forms of 
differentiation, which we are only beginning to develop conceptual tools 
to address.  Most obvious among these is the emergence of multi-national 
financial institutions that can wreak havoc on entire regions and 
economies, yet which are beyond the writ of state regulation. Global 
supply chains likewise represent unprecedented concentrations of power. 
Technological advance creates new forms of peripheralization (Batteau 
2010) and new forms of control, and industrialization on the periphery 
creates both new forms of prosperity and new forms of misery.     
Developments such as these create an ethical confrontation for 
which we offer no easy solution. Large institutions, almost by definition, 
are ethically problematic, in that they concentrate power among insular 
elites, and extend that power into a diversity of communities, which share 
almost none of their assumptions and have almost no recourse in 
responding to that power: a very definition of tyranny. Technological 
developments have enabled the global reach of power to exceed the grasp 
of mutual understanding. Yet retreating into privileged ivory towers 
raises the ethical questions of using power and privilege to impede 
communication.   
For anthropologists, a corporate encounter is the ethical response 
to these developments. Anthropology’s corporate encounter comes 
variously in the form of the anthropology “of” business, anthropology “in” 
business, and anthropology “for” business (Baba 2012). Anthropology of 
business goes back to Warner and Low’s Social System of a Modern 
Factory, and is more recently exemplified by recent studies of financial 
institutions (Warner and Low 1947). Anthropology in business is 
exemplified by numerous anthropologists working in software and other 
information technology industries, just as use of ethnographic techniques 
in marketing can be considered anthropology for business.  Researchers 
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and practitioners in these milieux successfully balance institutional 
affiliations with intellectual detachment, advancing goods of both 
intellectual pursuit and practical effect. Each of these has contributed to 
anthropological theory and our understanding of contemporary 
institutions, so much so that making fine-grained distinctions about “of,” 
“in,” and “for” is probably an exercise better left to contemporary 
Scholastics.     
Anthropologists “studying up” into these institutions, whether 
exemplified by Karen Ho’s study of investment bankers (Ho 2009), Caitlin 
Zaloom’s study of futures traders (Zaloom 2006), or many other recent 
studies (see also Baba, 2005, 2009; Hertz 1998; Krawinkler 2013; Tett 
2009; Zelizer 1994) achieve a first-hand, immersive familiarity, not 
typically found among other researchers or critics, with institutions that 
are increasingly shaping the world. From these studies we learn how 
trust is constructed, how “shareholder value” is invented, and how global 
reach is performed. We begin to see that the man behind the curtain6 is 
doing little more than creating an illusion of smoke and mirrors, which 
impresses a credulous public. What is necessary at this point is to take 
some of these important findings and popularize them:  Coming of Age on 
Wall Street, just might, one could hope, contribute as much to a turnover 
in social values as Coming of Age in Samoa did for gender roles nearly a 
century ago.  
Anthropology’s “colonial encounter” arguably resulted in 
relationships among nations that were less tinged with racism and more 
respectful of a shared humanity. Although many other historical currents 
contributed to this, and although the religious violence of the sixteenth 
century and the nationalist violence of the nineteenth century are being 
replaced by structural violence today (Farmer 2005), no one would argue 
that improved understanding among nations is not a Good Thing. The 
ethical foundation of this lies in the enlarged social world that 
anthropology and these other historical currents created, making it 
imperative for philosophers and policymakers alike to acknowledge 
issues of shared humanity. We should, of course, acknowledge that this is 
a project that has a uniquely modern specificity.  
Anthropology’s epistemic challenge in the 21st century is to create a 
similar, empathetic, immersive understanding of the structural 
imbalances that exist in the world today, whether furthered by repressive 
governments, irresponsible institutions, or careless businesses. Practices 
that from a distance seem morally repellent become more 
                                                        
6 This is an allusion to the Wizard of Oz, an allegory of 19th-century 
industrialization in America.   In L. Frank Baum’s 1900 allegory, the farmers (the 
straw man) didn’t have a brain, industry (the tin man) lacked a heart, and Wall 
Street was a cowardly lion.  MGM’s 1939 musical version of Baum’s Progressive-
Era classic lacked some of these acerbic insights.   
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understandable, less mystifying, and possibly more transient and 
malleable as one gets closer to them.  
This is not, however, an argument that anthropology become a form 
of do-gooding, helping hedge fund operators to see the error of their 
ways. Rather, by de-mystifying the upper reaches of global institutions, by 
pinpointing the differences between true predation and business-as-
usual, and by contributing to the ethical balance sheet of business-as-
usual, anthropology has the tools and the intellectual capability to 
humanize and civilize institutions that today are too-frequently seen as 
inhumane and out of control.  In an increasingly complex world, this is 
both an epistemological and an ethical imperative: to comprehend in 
depth the ethical priorities of two (or more) opposed life-worlds, and yet 
discern their shared humanity.    
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